How do developmental state legacies affect voters’ conception of the left-right schema?

Date of Publication:
20 June 2025

Faith Ashley CHU
Public Policy and Global Affairs Freshman, Nanyang Technological University

Suggested Citation
(APA) Chu, F. A. (2025) How do developmental state legacies affect voters’ conception of the left-right schema? EAYSA Anchor. https://eaysa.org/anchor-articles-how-do-developmental-state-legacies-affect-voters-conception-of-the-left-right-schema/.
(MLA) Chu, Faith Ashley. “How Do Developmental State Legacies Affect Voters’ Conception of the Left-Right Schema?” EAYSA Anchor, 2025, https://eaysa.org/anchor-articles-how-do-developmental-state-legacies-affect-voters-conception-of-the-left-right-schema/.
(Harvard) Chu, F.A., 2025. How do developmental state legacies affect voters’ conception of the left-right schema? EAYSA Anchor. Available at: https://eaysa.org/anchor-articles-how-do-developmental-state-legacies-affect-voters-conception-of-the-left-right-schema/.

Abstract

The developmental state, characterised by heavy government intervention in the economy and authoritarian governance, was crucial to the rise of the 20th-century Asian Tigers. This style of governance defied conventional ideological binaries by blending elements traditionally associated with the left and the right. This article explores how path dependency helps explain the enduring influence of the developmental state on political behaviour and institutions, specifically how voters perceive and apply the left-right schema. It argues that voting systems are influenced by the legacies of state-led pragmatism, which has resulted in the weak partisanship observed in emerging democracies.

Keywords: political spectrum, voting behaviour, developmental state theory, East Asia, democracy

Introduction

For centuries, the left-right political spectrum has been the dominant framework for understanding ideological differences, shaping political discourse and party alignments. However, this restrictive framework often fails to capture the fluidity and complexity of political beliefs, particularly in developmental states, where ideological overlaps and pragmatic governance challenge traditional binary categorisations. Hence, this article aims to examine the limitations of the left-right schema in interpreting political behaviour in developmental states.

This article will proceed in three sections. First, I unpack how voters traditionally understand the left-right binary. This section will show that governance in developmental states defies straightforward classification within Western political taxonomies. My subsequent arguments centre on the origins and characteristics of the developmental state, drawing links between prevailing majoritarian electoral systems and the weak partisan culture among voters. This article ultimately argues that developmental state legacies continue to shape how voters engage with ideology and partisanship, complicating the conventional left-right schema.

Demystifying the left-right schema

Originating from the 18th-century French Revolution, the left originally referred to those who sat on the left side of the National Assembly, advocating for radical change, egalitarianism, and the overthrow of the monarchy, while the right represented those favouring tradition, hierarchy, and the preservation of the status quo. These ‘baskets’ of ideas have evolved in tandem with an increasingly complex and interconnected world, reflecting diverse socio-economic priorities and cultural values. Cleavages within societies have altered over time and across countries, governments, and the level of economic development.

The political compass framework (Figure 1) is a useful tool for mapping political ideologies. It consists of two axes that measure state control over society (y-axis) and the economy (x-axis), thereby capturing the multidimensional nature of political orientation.

Figure 1: The political compass

Developmental states typically exhibit strong state control over the economy and society, placing them on the authoritarian half of the compass. Despite strong state involvement, these states usually pursue market-oriented capitalist policies and export-led growth rather than socialist economic models, which defy traditional ideological categorisations. The left-right system has demonstrated its utility in helping voters navigate the marketplace of political messages and shape their electoral choices from a macro perspective (Jou, 2010). However, the utility of this scheme is undercut when examined through the lens of developmental states, where their unique developmental trajectory and historical contexts have not been adequately accounted for by Western norms.

Hybrid policies of the developmental state

The term developmental state was coined to capture the institutional and policy features of the hitherto fast-growing Japanese economy, which did not align with either state socialism or Western capitalism (Johnson, 1982). Developmental states like Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea preferred pragmatic, growth-oriented policies over rigid ideological doctrines. Lee Kuan Yew, the founding father of Singapore, was a stern advocate of pragmatism, claiming that he was not ‘enamoured with ideology’ but instead with ‘what works’ (Woo, 2018). For these leaders, the state was seen as an instrument to achieve economic goals, not to fulfil ideological dogma.

Sartori (1969, cited in Tan, 2011) conceptualised ideology and pragmatism as polar types; with the former functioning as ‘a closed belief-system consisting of fixed elements that are strongly felt, rigid, dogmatic and impermeable to arguments and evidence’ and the latter ‘an open belief-system consisting of flexible elements that are weakly felt, open to arguments and evidence, and changeable even for the sake of convenience’. However, it is important to note that in actuality, the absence of ideology serves as an ideology in itself, albeit a second-order one, constructed as a bulwark against ‘fixed’ ideologies like socialism or communism. The effectiveness of pragmatism as a meta-ideology was noted by Eckstein et al. (1998), who posited that an adherence to alternative ideologies or cultural beliefs made it difficult for citizens to orient themselves, especially towards the values of liberalism and pluralism in the Western democratic order. The flexibility of the pragmatic ethos allowed governments to pursue policies from both the ‘right’ and the ‘left’ without appearing inconsistent, as long as economic growth materialised and stability was maintained. Indeed, Chua (1997, cited in Tan, 2011) argues that the government ‘‘characterises possible course-changing as the positive result of its ‘pragmatic’ flexibility in policy making and administration, rather than due to confusion or contradictions’’. Pragmatism therefore made the means to achieve national progress an open-ended question, which facilitated the state’s entry into the economy as an architect that sets the direction of economic growth.

Developmental states pursued liberalisation and deregulation policies to secure and sustain economic growth. To that end, governments took an active, rather than passive, role in planning and financing industrial growth in identified sectors. In Japan, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) effectively ran much of Japanese industrial policy, funding research and directing investment (Johnson, 1982). This system of economic bureaucracy achieved long-term economic goals, including modernisation and global competitiveness. While these state-led policies contradicted classical free-market orthodoxy often associated with right-wing libertarianism, developmental states simultaneously incorporated elements traditionally associated with the right. According to Cheang and Lim (2023, p. 182), Singapore is ranked as a small government by economic freedom indices while simultaneously exerting considerable influence over economic activity, demonstrating the coexistence of state control and free-market mechanisms in developmental state models. Control over society and the economy required authoritarian and/or technocratic governance, where political freedoms were limited, and labour movements or leftist ideologies were suppressed. This was seen in states like South Korea under Park Chung-hee, or Taiwan, where civil liberties were curtailed and martial law imposed as part of the Kuomintang government’s anti-communism efforts (Jou, 2010). These examples illustrate how developmental states aimed to achieve the best of both worlds—capitalist economic growth under strong state direction, and the suppression of civil liberties in the name of stability and progress.

While developmental states typically exercised strong state control over civil society, including censorship and restrictions on political opposition, they were not socialist in orientation. Rather, their extensive economic planning and coordination was aimed at encouraging capitalist growth, paradoxically aligned with neo-liberal goals, yet often thought to be in tension with its core principle of minimal state intervention and free-market orthodoxy. Pragmatists are willing to adopt any means as long as the ends are successfully achieved through these means (Tan, 2011). Developmental states used this pragmatic approach to balance state intervention, market forces, and political control. The combination of both state-led capitalist policies and authoritarian governance as the means to achieve rapid economic growth therefore complicates a straightforward classification of developmental states within the traditional left-right spectrum.

Weak ideological contestation in young democracies

Strong state intervention in both society and the economy often has profound consequences on the way civil society engages with politics. A key feature of the developmental state theory is the presence of heavy state paternalism in both society and the economy. This top-down dynamic is reflected in Mawdūdī’s (2019, p. 11) observation that ‘the elite class… prepares the way and then leads the people on the track prepared for them’. Developmental state legacies prioritising growth and stability have shaped East Asian political alignments to be driven more by perceptions of economic performance legitimacy than ideological commitments (Jou, 2011), thereby narrowing the scope and dampening the intensity of ideological competition.

Using state apparatuses such as imprisonment, detention, and surveillance, South Korea and Singapore suppressed communist movements and left-wing ideologies, framing them as existential threats to national security and development (Kraft, 2006; Rajah, 2012). In reality, the repression of left-leaning thought was instrumental to the functioning of the capitalist economy. By suppressing leftist ideologies, the development of a broad ideological spectrum across civil society was effectively curtailed.

The close relationship between the economy, government, and government-linked agencies or companies has also played a pivotal role in ensuring stability by fostering alignment among key stakeholders in society. For example, Takagi et al. (2019) identified the calibration of the interests of the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP), key government agencies, and the middle class as key to maintaining PAP hegemony. This tight-knit relationship has effectively minimised ideological polarisation, further reinforcing the centrist, consensus-driven political landscape. As East Asians typically evaluate governance and democracy not in terms of pluralism or individual rights, but through a communitarian and performance-based lens (Shin & Cho, 2010), these quasi-cronyistic practices have often been overlooked or tolerated so long as communal stability and economic growth are achieved. In such contexts, ideological conflicts within society are minimised.

As Jou (2010) argues, for the left–right dimension to effectively guide vote choice, voters must be able to map their self-placement onto a party that visibly aligns with their values. However, in many young Asian Tiger democracies, parties often converge around similar, non-partisan goals (Jou, 2010) such as economic development or national identity, undermining the utility of ideological labels. This is especially salient in Taiwan, as Dalton and Tanaka (2007) observe, where ‘the right means a position closer to the traditional authority (the Kuomintang), whereas a leftist orientation means a position farther away from the traditional authority’. In this context, the left-right dimension does not fully capture party positions on specific policy orientations where there is but modest differentiation. This is further complicated by Taiwan’s political landscape, wherein the left-right self-identification combines issues like anti-(left) and pro-(right) traditional authority and pro-independence vs. pro-unification with China (Dalton & Tanaka, 2007).

In young East Asian democracies, most parties have short histories and therefore cannot rely on support created through generational legacies or performance legitimacy. For many parties, the focus hence shifted to policy-based campaigning (Fell, 2005, cited in Jou, 2010), which they utilised to achieve broad-based consensus among a diverse electorate. As a result, developmental state legacies have not only limited political polarisation but also created an environment where voters lack engagement with clear ideological touchstones. The absence of distinct ideological alternatives has left most parties struggling to differentiate themselves beyond policy-based debates, further weakening ideological contestation and partisan identification in East Asia.

Majoritarian electoral systems encourage party convergence

Just as the semantics of ‘left’ and ‘right’ have characterised or even defined party systems in many countries, developmental state legacies have greatly impacted electoral systems in East Asia. Dalton and Tanaka (2007) argue that party systems provide a general structure for discussing and addressing social conflicts within a state. Political parties contextualise selected social, political, and economic issues into coherent ‘baskets’, aiding voters in interpreting these issues through the lens of ideological positions and party priorities. At a macro-level, electoral systems themselves have played a pivotal role in reshaping party competition and in the process, redefining the meanings of ‘left’ and ‘right’ within those systems. Designed during managed democratic transitions, these electoral systems reflect the key tenets of developmental state legacy—A preference for top-down political change initiated by the elites over disruptive forms of mass mobilisation (Takagi et al., 2019). Frederick Douglass famously noted that ‘Power concedes nothing without a demand’: The strategic and calculated concession by the ruling elites was carefully executed to preserve order and stability in society. The East Asian democratisation wave that began in the 1980s hence led to the adoption of electoral systems with majoritarian characteristics, designed to reproduce stable governments and limit political fragmentation.

First-past-the-post (FPTP) and mixed electoral systems are more common than pure proportional representation (PR) systems in East Asia (Reilly, 2007). The FPTP system is where voters choose a single candidate, and the candidate with the most votes is elected, even if they do not have more than half of the votes. In such a winner-takes-all system, parties are incentivised to appeal to the median voter, resulting in policy convergence and weakened ideological differentiation between parties. Voters have little incentive to vote for a party that they align with but they know will not win, as they perceive their votes to have no effect within a two-party plurality system. Established parties in an FPTP system with a majority of parliamentary seats can implement their desired policies without engaging in constant negotiations with other parties. This is evident in Singapore’s dominant one-party system. Following the landslide victory won by the People’s Action Party (PAP) in 2015, the country experienced a wave of democratic backsliding (Abdullah, 2020). Between 2015 and 2020, the PAP government demonstrated its willingness to implement and increase its use of draconian laws like the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA), which has been widely perceived as a tool to curb dissent and target government critics. The implications of these electoral arrangements on partisan polarisation are significant and expected: Croissant and Völkel (2010) observed that FPTP systems promoted more centrist and stable politics by encouraging fewer, more cohesive, and better institutionalised political parties. In contrast to FPTP systems, PR systems are associated with higher levels of voter satisfaction, as citizens are more cognisant of the influence their votes have on electoral outcomes, hence increasing voter turnout and political engagement (Norris, 1997). Reed et al. (2012) observed that Japan’s mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system, combining FPTP and a PR component for single-member districts, creates incentives for centrism. Coupled with the institutionalised legacies of developmental states, FPTP systems further reinforce weak partisanship where voters struggle to distinguish between parties based on ideology.

Kirchheimer (1966) theorised that dominant political parties would evolve into ‘catch-all’ parties during democratic transitions. Unsurprisingly, political syncretism has emerged as a hallmark of democratic transitions in East Asian states. Vincent (2017) observed that electoral defeat and the loss of dominant party status incentivise parties to adopt a catch-all model. Both Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and South Korea’s Saenuri Party have demonstrated significant ideological flexibility to appeal to a broader electorate, resulting in weakened differentiation between parties within the same electoral system. For example, although the Democratic Party of Japan emerged as the primary challenger to the dominant LDP, Miura et al. (2005) noted that the former’s stance on various issues often fails to distinguish it sufficiently from the latter. In a bid to retain or increase their relative standing in the electoral system, catch-all parties remain noncommittal to concrete ideologies and political tradition. As a result, voters struggle to map their beliefs to a party that reliably aligns with themselves, leading to the dilution of ideological convictions across the electorate.

Converging party positions in new democracies often reveal parties’ ongoing efforts to appeal to the median voter. This convergence not only reflects pragmatic electoral strategies but also the lingering effects of developmental state ideologies, which historically prioritised economic growth over ideological pluralism. Dalton and Tanaka (2007) found that the greatest party polarisation exists in the established democracies like Japan, and not in the new democracies of Taiwan or South Korea. In Taiwan, for instance, Cooper (1998, cited in Jou, 2010) found that while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) initially campaigned on democratisation and the need for a competitive party system, new issues such as national identity and social welfare soon eclipsed the fight for civil liberties. Lee (2007, cited in Jou, 2010) noted that the mode of democratic transition in South Korea involved ‘compromises between the authoritarian regime and the opposition’, which obscured the pro-authoritarian versus anti-authoritarian divide. The lack of a clean break between regime changes complicates voters’ self-identification with parties and governments, which may preside over ambiguous legacies. These findings in newer democracies suggest that democratic maturation and the development of ideological alternatives require time, and voters need exposure to clear ideological anchors to make sense of and navigate the political landscape.

Conclusion

The developmental state model is one where legitimacy is less derived from ideological alignments than from perceptions of performance and stability. Young democracies continue to bear the imprint of developmental state legacies, where elite-managed democratisation transitions and an emphasis on economic growth have constrained the ideological breadth of electoral competition. The predominance of the FPTP system in emerging democracies has further entrenched these patterns by incentivising centrism and weakening party differentiation. These institutionalised legacies of state-led development continue to shape the political landscape, constraining the development of a diverse ideological spectrum. Ultimately, this path dependency has fostered a political culture where weak ideological contestation renders traditional left–right distinctions less salient and meaningful.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my managing editor, Matthew, for his valuable critique and feedback, and to my friends for their comments on my work. I am also deeply thankful to the editors at the East Asia Young Scholars Association for this valuable opportunity. All remaining errors are my own.

Biography

Faith is a first-year student studying Public Policy and Global Affairs at the Nanyang Technological University of Singapore.

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